

An Assessment of the Relationship  
Between Canadian Diplomats and the Military

for

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An Essay by

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In the nineteenth century, under the guidance of Leopold van Ranke, the German school of scientific history advocated for the primacy of contemporaneously written sources over oral testimony, which they dismissed as subjective and “prized only by well-meaning but naive amateurs and antiquarians.”<sup>1</sup> This assertion is no longer true today. Rather, oral history is seen as an effective and legitimate tool that can be used by modern historians to garner information and illuminate details that may otherwise be neglected in documentary sources.

In March 2019, I conducted oral history interviews with three former Canadian diplomats: Nick Etheridge, David Collins, and Phil Calvert.<sup>2</sup> The scholarly value of these interviews is twofold: they provide firsthand information that supplement the existing literature on Canadian diplomats; and, when analyzed conjunctively, reveal findings that are absent in the literature.

The intention of this paper is to assess the relationship between Canadian diplomats and the Canadian Armed Forces using oral history. This essay outlines and examines the careers of the three interviewed diplomats. From their experiences and reflections, I will draw three arguments. Firstly, I will contend that while the two generally work well together operationally, differences can occur with respect to policy. Secondly, I will assert that the relationship is influenced by the individual personalities of those involved—especially the level of understanding that one has for the other. Finally, with these in mind, I will outline recommendations for improving the relationship: chiefly that its importance must be institutionalized rather than continue to be dependent on the interest and personality of individuals.

Nick Etheridge was born in 1944 in Cornwall, UK. He emigrated with his family to Canada in 1947, settling in Victoria. Growing up he attended St. Michael’s and University

Schools in Victoria where he was a member of the Canadian Scottish Regiment Cadet Corps. From 1961 to 1965, he attended the University of Victoria where he earned a Bachelor of Arts in History and English. During his time at the University of Victoria, he enrolled in the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve University Training Division where he trained on the HMCS *Malahat*. After graduating from the University of Victoria, he obtained a postgraduate degree from the University of Aberdeen in Scotland. In 1967, he joined the diplomatic service.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Etheridge's motivation for joining the diplomatic service was his interest in foreign cultures and history. For him, the "wanderlust was there from the beginning."<sup>4</sup> Throughout his career he held various posts in Ottawa and overseas in: Australia (1968-70 and 1990-92), Vietnam (1972-73), Iraq (1976-77), Cambodia (1993), Latvia (1993-95), and Bangladesh (1996-99). Additionally, he took part in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Geneva (1975-6) where he was involved in the negotiations of the Helsinki Final Act. He also took part in further CSCE meetings in Belgrade (1977), Madrid (1981), and Ottawa (1985). Throughout his career, Mr. Etheridge worked primarily in the political and economic streams of the diplomatic service. Although, having often worked in smaller embassies he was frequently exposed to other fields such as trade promotion and development work.<sup>5</sup>

The majority of my interview with Mr. Etheridge focuses on his time in Vietnam from autumn 1972 to summer 1973 when he served as part of the Canadian delegation to the International Control Commission (ICC) and later, the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS).<sup>6</sup> Without providing an in depth summary of the causes of the Vietnam War, I believe a pithy look at how the Commissions originated is required. In summer 1954, following the catastrophic defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu at the hands of the Viet Minh (a coalition of Communists and nationalists), the world's major powers met in Geneva.<sup>7</sup> There, it

was decided that the country was to be divided into two halves along the 17th parallel: the Communists would control “North Vietnam” (with Hanoi as its capital) and, the anti-Communists would occupy “South Vietnam” (with Saigon as its capital). A ceasefire would allow the two opposing forces to disengage and retreat back to their respective sides. To oversee this, the Geneva Conference established the ICC which was to be made up of Canada (a western democracy) and Poland (Communist), and would be chaired by India (theoretically neutral).<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the ICC was tasked to prevent either side from building up military capabilities and resuming hostilities.<sup>9</sup> Although the ICC enjoyed some initial success, the arrangement of having both a Communist and non-Communist country represented on the same committee soon proved to be a formula for deadlock.<sup>10</sup>

The Geneva Conference stipulated that elections were to be held in both the North and South in order to eventually unify the country. However, unsurprisingly, this demand was ignored by both the Communists and South Vietnamese.<sup>11</sup> The latter were undoubtedly encouraged to do so by the Americans who were “unhappy with the concessions made to the Communists and [were] trying to disassociate [themselves] from the plan.”<sup>12</sup> This disregard for the Geneva Accords culminated when both sides armed themselves, supported by the major powers (the Soviet Union and China backing the North, while the US backed the South).<sup>13</sup>

It is suggested by J. L. Granatstein in *War and Peacemaking* that in view of these nonobservances committed by both sides, the existence of the ICC in Vietnam was ill-fated from the onset.<sup>14</sup> While this may be true, the work of the ICC continued for nineteen years, during which the war in Vietnam—and American involvement—escalated tremendously. By 1963, the rise in guerrilla insurgency by the Viet Cong (Viet Minh cadres that had remained in South Vietnam after their withdrawal) and were thought to be the “primary source of Communist

strength in South Vietnam,” led to a full-scale American military intervention.<sup>15</sup> As the war intensified through the 1960s, the ICC faced increasing challenges to conduct its work (i.e. evidence gathering).<sup>16</sup>

The war, or at least American involvement in it, officially ended in early 1973 after the Paris Peace Agreement. Following this, the work of the ICC concluded and it was replaced by the new ICCS. The ICCS was established in January 1973 to monitor the new ceasefire in South Vietnam, as well as oversee the exchange of prisoners of war. Modelled after its predecessor, the ICCS included Communist and non-Communist countries: Poland (Communist), Hungary (Communist), Canada (non-Communist), and Indonesia (non-Communist). Though, unlike the ICC, the new commission dropped India in its role as “neutral” chair<sup>17</sup>—the chairmanship would now rotate amongst the member states.<sup>18</sup> Also different was that the ICCS did not operate regional outposts in the North.<sup>19</sup>

Granatstein asserts that Canada reluctantly agreed to join the ICCS after “two decades of unhappy and frustrating experiences on the ICC.”<sup>20</sup> Doubting that the ICCS would be any more effective than its predecessor, though realizing that it may help the Americans withdraw from the conflict, the Canadian Government agreed to participate for two months.<sup>21</sup> The Canadian ambassador to the ICCS, Michael Gauvin, was encouraged to pursue a policy of “open mouth” diplomacy—publicly reporting to the media any obstacles or interference that the Commission faced. Nevertheless, many of the same problems that had bedevilled the ICC were again present: the inclusion of both Communist and non-Communist countries proved once more to be a formula for deadlock. Canada ultimately withdrew from the ICCS in the summer of 1973. The Vietnam War continued until April 1975, when the Communists seized complete control of the country.<sup>22</sup>

Mr. Etheridge arrived in Vietnam in November 1972 as a member of the Canadian delegation to the ICC. He was tasked with running the Canadian office in Hanoi alongside two Canadian soldiers (a Major and a Sergeant). By the time he arrived “the functions of the old committee were largely defunct” and had “kept going as a symbol.”<sup>23</sup> Although the official role of the ICC was supervisory, towards the end of its existence it had become an “ersatz diplomatic mission” with the primary function of Canadian diplomats being to observe the situation in Hanoi.<sup>24</sup>

In addressing the interaction he had with his military counterparts in Hanoi, Mr. Etheridge describes that their primary focus was survival. As Granatstein remarked: “In Hanoi the teams faced more sobering conditions” — certainly the most palpable of which was the threat of American bombing raids.<sup>25</sup> Mr. Etheridge describes that during the B-52 and F-111 raids by the United States Airforce (USAF) over Hanoi in December 1972, they along with other diplomats and visitors (i.e. Joan Baez who had travelled to Vietnam to deliver Christmas cards to American prisoners of war) would take shelter in the deep basement of the Thong Nhat Reunification Hotel (now the Metropole Hotel). The Americans had resumed bombing in connection with the final stages of the Paris Peace Agreement. As would be expected in any wartime situation, there were some “wild moments, and some crazy moments, and even almost some fun moments” but it was nevertheless a very taxing and unpleasant time — and importantly an experience that both diplomats and military personnel shared.<sup>26</sup>

As was previously mentioned, the primary function of Canadians serving in Hanoi was to observe their surroundings. An important task that Mr. Etheridge and his military counterparts carried out together was taking down the names and particulars of USAF B-52 pilots who had been shot down (mainly by surface-to-air missiles) and subsequently captured in North Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese would hold press conferences each evening where the captured prisoners would be paraded in a trophy-like fashion.<sup>27</sup>

In April 1973, Mr. Etheridge was responsible for closing the Canadian ICC office in Hanoi. He was subsequently transferred to Saigon where he was part of the Canadian delegation to the ICCS. During this period, he notes that the interaction between the military and foreign affairs was more active than it had previously been—although as he points out he was not directly involved in this. He does however mention that he felt that the military seemed generally more enthusiastic about taking part in the ICCS than were foreign affairs personnel. Mr. Etheridge suggests that there are two reasons for this: firstly, the military viewed participation in the ICCS as an opportunity to deploy forces in the field; and secondly, they saw it as a potential avenue to increase defence cooperation with the Americans.<sup>28</sup>

A major theme in some of the literature about Canada's involvement in the ICC and ICCS is an assessment that Canada acted as a proxy for American interests.<sup>29</sup> This theory forms the basis of Charles Taylor's polemical account of Canada's participation in the ICC and ICCS in his book, *Snow Job*. Indeed, Taylor goes as far to claim that Canada ought to be regarded as an accomplice in a "senseless and horrendous war."<sup>30</sup> As this is a particularly acerbic and cynical assessment of Canada's involvement in the ICC and ICCS, I asked Mr. Etheridge for his opinion on it. He contends that Canadian governments tend to see diplomatic cooperation with the US in the context of the bigger picture of close US-Canada economic relations. This was especially so in the period between 1954 and 1975 when Canadian foreign policy was heavily Atlanticist and informed by Cold War considerations which we shared with the Americans. Certainly, this assertion holds true in Vietnam. However, as for his own operation on the ICC and ICCS, he never felt himself to be a pawn of the Americans in any way.<sup>31</sup>

The difference in the level of interaction with Americans shown by the military and the foreign service informs Mr. Etheridge's argument that where the two differ is "more on policy and less on operations."<sup>32</sup> That is to say, the military is typically more inclined to want to work more intimately with the Americans, whereas the foreign service tends to be more cautious of this. Though the military were probably always more enthusiastic about participation in the ICCS than the diplomats for reasons that have already been mentioned, Mr. Etheridge considers that the operational cooperation in the field was consistently good. His later career (e.g. in Cambodia, post 9/11 planning, and in working with Canadian Forces defence attachés) largely bore out of this experience. He observes that where the two departments can diverge is on policy issues, especially those where National Defence places a higher premium on close cooperation with the Americans.<sup>33</sup>

Looking at the history of the ICC and ICCS in Vietnam, coupled with Mr. Etheridge's personal experience, provides a tangible case study of the type of work Canadian diplomats and military personnel carry out together operationally. Crucially, it exposes areas of the relationship where the two diverge in their approach.

David Collins was born in Ottawa in 1953. As a child, he went to primary school in Halifax and high school in Ottawa. He attended university at Queen's (Kingston), Loyola (now Concordia), and Durham in the UK where he studied history, politics, and eventually business. During his first year of studies at Queen's he signed up for the Reserve Officer University Training Program at HMCS *Cataraqui*. Over the span of three summers, Mr. Collins eventually qualified to be a supply and naval control of shipping officer. In 1977, aboard the HMCS *Huron*, he took part in the Silver Jubilee Fleet Review at Spit Head in the UK. Mr. Collins' career in the



naval reserves lasted sixteen years until his full-time job started to interfere. By the time of his retirement in 1989 he had reached the rank of Lieutenant Commander.<sup>34</sup>

In 1976, Mr. Collins joined the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce and was on secondment to the Trade Commissioner Service overseas before formally entering the diplomatic service in 1982. For the first part of his career he drew on his background in business as a trade commissioner. As his career progressed he gained more familiarity with other aspects of the foreign service which eventually led to his ambassadorial appointments. Over his career Mr. Collins held various posts in Ottawa and overseas including in the US, Poland, Turkey, South Korea, and as Head of Mission (HOM) in Romania, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Kenya. Additionally, he twice worked at the NATO headquarters in Brussels: first as a member of the Canadian delegation, and then again on the staff of the International Secretariat.<sup>35</sup>

Mr. Collins' interpretation of the relationship between the military and foreign affairs is informed by his own naval service. In his view, being able to draw on his own experience provided him with more credibility when he was working alongside the military as a diplomat. During our interview he illustrated this point by saying that on one occasion an experienced military attaché told him: "I can tell when I first meet a Head of Mission within five minutes whether he or she is going to be interested in my program."<sup>36</sup>

One area where Mr. Collins asserts that, in his experience, the two worked well together was on the marketing of defence products. In the mid 1990s, with Foreign Affairs moving away from this line of work, a program was designed to co-operatively market the Canadian Patrol Frigate (and its systems, i. e. navigation and combat) to other countries with the help of the Navy. In addition to their regular functions, ships on deployment would go to countries that were

thought to be potential customers. In this instance, Mr. Collins observes that there was “hardly any friction at all” in the relationship.<sup>37</sup>

Conversely, one area where he suggests that the relationship was not always as successful was on matters of policy. He contends that this “policy dissonance” often revealed itself in discourses on disarmament and how aggressive Canada should be in deploying military force. Very much like Mr. Etheridge’s assessment in the context of the ICCS, Mr. Collins suggests that often times the military is eager and “ready like a coiled spring” to engage itself.<sup>38</sup> Such a tendency can cause disagreement in the relationship. To demonstrate this, Mr. Collins points to Canada’s decision to not participate in the US/British coalition to invade Iraq in 2003. He feels that it was likely (although he was not personally involved), that the military was ready and willing to be deployed—partly out of a willingness to co-operate with the Americans. This underscores a central criticism of the military: that in their eagerness “they wouldn’t look at the wider nuances of foreign policy interests.”<sup>39</sup>

Phil Calvert was born in 1957 in Salmon Arm and grew up in Prince George. He was educated at the University of British Columbia, York University (Toronto), and completed his doctorate at the University of Washington (Seattle) in 1991. Throughout his studies, Dr. Calvert focused on Chinese history and language. He joined the diplomatic service in 1982. His first assignment was as a trade commissioner in Beijing from 1984 to 1987. Dr. Calvert spent most of his career working in Beijing—where he was posted three times. Additionally, his last assignment was in Bangkok where he was ambassador to Thailand, Cambodia and Laos from 2012 to 2016.<sup>40</sup>

Dr. Calvert contends that Canada has long maintained an atlanticist preoccupation in its foreign policy. That is to say, despite a growing awareness of the importance of China towards

the end of the twentieth century, it continued to be treated as a “boutique relationship.”<sup>41</sup> He further illustrates this point by adding that: “for twenty years at least after I joined [the diplomatic service], China was not on the agenda of the G7.”<sup>42</sup> Indeed, this attitude can be traced back to the Joint Intelligence Committee’s report to the Chiefs of Staff in 1947 on where future military attachés should be located: “...it is recognized that a study of the Chinese Army is of some importance. There is already a Military Attaché in Nan King [*sic*], and it is recommended that the post be retained.”<sup>43</sup> Interestingly, the usefulness of such a recommendation was questioned by Lester Pearson when he was Under Secretary of State for External Affairs.<sup>44</sup> However, by the time Dr. Calvert arrived in Beijing there had been a Canadian Forces Attaché (CFA) present for sometime.<sup>45</sup> On the work that they carry out, Dr. Calvert asserts that their ability to report on the military state of affairs in the country is often impeded by the local authorities. With a limited capability to execute their work, CFAs face a frustrating task in China.<sup>46</sup>

To illustrate the relationship between military and foreign service personnel, Dr. Calvert draws on his experience as ambassador in Bangkok. In Thailand the military is a powerful independent entity that reports directly to the King. Considering this, the need for an effective relationship with the military is obvious. One way in which Dr. Calvert suggests this was done was through the promotion of Canadian defence products (i. e. refuelling technology) with the help of the CFA. Seen as a natural promoter, the CFA was able to better cultivate the relationship and communicate because “military people often like to talk to other military people.”<sup>47</sup>

Furthermore, Dr. Calvert uses the example of the 2014 Thai military coup to show how CFAs can influence policy discussions. In this case, while there was some disagreement on how Canada should respond to the situation, the CFA advocated to continue diplomatic relations. Dr.

Calvert suggests that in this instance his decision was influenced by the CFA's advice, as he eventually concluded that: "whether we engage with them or not is not going to change the fact they had a coup. It's not going bring democracy back."<sup>48</sup>

In assessing where there is disagreement in the relationship between diplomats and the military, Dr. Calvert agrees with Mr. Etheridge's assessment that this usually occurs with respect to policy. He does, however, add that he thinks this is exacerbated if the two sides don't communicate prior to reporting back to Ottawa. Understanding where the other side is coming from is critical for running a successful diplomatic mission because "if you can't bridge gaps in an embassy where everyone is together, you will never be able to do it in Ottawa where the silos are so big."<sup>49</sup> On this, he asserts that the ambassador must set the example, as it is his prerogative to ensure cohesion in the embassy. Additionally he adds that, in his experience, the military and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) were most respectful of the position of ambassador, as they had a clearer understanding of the chain of command.<sup>50</sup>

The final section of this paper will assess the relationship using the three interviews collectively, and outline the recommendations on how it can be improved. Something that is revealed listening to the interviews of all three men is that the relationship between diplomats and the military is very dependent on the individual personalities, interests, and skill-sets of those involved. During Mr. Etheridge's tenure as High Commissioner to Bangladesh, his relationship with the CFA (who was accredited to Bangladesh from India) was extremely positive. In this instance, Mr. Etheridge echoes Dr. Calvert's assessment that CFAs play an important role in cultivating relationships with the local military, which in Bangladesh and Thailand is extremely powerful in domestic affairs.<sup>51</sup>

Mr. Collins observes that over his career there was a decline in the understanding of the military amongst diplomats. That is to say, when Mr. Collins entered the public service in 1976 there were still Second World War and Korean War veterans employed. However, this connection has started to diminish as their children are now reaching retirement age. He contends that this lack of awareness shows itself in how defence is funded in Canada. With “no votes in defence,” the government feels little need to increase spending on the military.<sup>52</sup>

I asked the other subjects if they also perceived there to be a decrease in the understanding of the military amongst the diplomatic service throughout their careers. While Mr. Etheridge concedes that this may be true, he thinks that it is dependent on how much interaction there is between the two. That is to say, there is better awareness when there is more work jointly conducted.<sup>53</sup> Dr. Calvert agrees with the statement, and thinks that it underscores the need for ambassadors to set the example in encouraging cohesion between the two.<sup>54</sup>

In his book, *The Diplomats*, Geoffrey Moorehouse offers a detailed assessment of contemporary British diplomacy. Unlike in the literature on Canadian diplomats, Moorehouse observes the relationship between military attachés and diplomats overseas. Although most of his observations are consistent with the information gathered in the interviews, he paraphrases one former ambassador who patronizingly implies that attachés are typically “not the very best men going” and are usually officers who are about to retire, as “the most ambitious men would probably dodge such an invitation because it would remove them for some years from the mainstream of their profession.”<sup>55</sup> From the interviews I conducted with three former diplomats, the reality in the Canadian context is much more nuanced. For example, the CFA that worked alongside Dr. Calvert in Bangkok for the first two or three years of his post was about to retire, however this did not influence his ability to conduct his work.<sup>56</sup> Mr. Etheridge had a similar

experience. He suspects only one of the CFAs he worked alongside was on the verge of retirement (in Bangladesh)—and this again did not affect the quality of his work.<sup>57</sup> When analyzed together, their responses show that the effectiveness of CFAs is highly dependent on the individual.

Common across all the three interviews is how important communication is to the relationship. Dr. Calvert describes that he sometimes perceived a disconnect between what the CFA, compared to other parts of the embassy, was reporting. He underscores the primacy of a consultative approach to reporting especially in China, where considering only one perspective may lead to an inexact view on a subject:

The military [in China] is more nationalistic and talks much more aggressively about their core issues of Taiwan and the South China Sea than politicians do. [Therefore, in this example] if you were to send just the military's views on what should happen in say, Taiwan...it could be much more alarmist.<sup>58</sup>

In this instance, the political side of the embassy may have a different outlook. Therefore, it is critical that both sides be encouraged by the ambassador to consult before reporting back to Ottawa.<sup>59</sup>

Dr. Calvert recommends that the relationship between diplomats and the military could be improved by cultivating better awareness of the other's role and opinion. That is to say, rather than the relationship being dependent on the interest, experience, and personality of individuals, "There should be an institutionalized requirement that they work better together."<sup>60</sup>

In this paper I have assessed the relationship between diplomats and the military. Doing so, I have used the oral history of three former Canadian diplomats. Mr. Nick Etheridge's interview focuses mainly on his time as a young diplomat when he served in the Canadian delegation to the ICC and ICCS in Vietnam from 1972 to 1973. His interview provides this paper

with a tangible case-study of how Canadian diplomats and military personnel interact operationally. Moreover, he underscores the areas where the relationship was effective, as well as aspects where there was divergence. Mr. Etheridge's evaluation of the relationship is that: while diplomats and military personnel often work well together operationally, differences can arise with respect to policy.

Mr. David Collins' interview provides a nuanced perspective to this paper. His assessment of the relationship is informed by his own military service and diplomatic experience in NATO. For an example of how the relationship was harnessed positively, he points to the marketing of defence products as a co-operative undertaking between Foreign Affairs and the Navy. Conversely, in demonstrating how the relationship can—at times—diverge, he echoes Mr. Etheridge in agreeing that this is usually with respect to policy.

Dr. Phil Calvert provides an outlook that is informed by his career spent mainly in China. His interview underscores that Canada has long had a transatlantic preoccupation in its foreign policy. Dr. Calvert draws on his time as ambassador to Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos to discuss the important work that CFAs do in cultivating relationships in countries where the military is powerful in domestic affairs and the influence this can have on policy discussions. Dr. Calvert attributes differences in the relationship between military personnel and diplomats to a lack of communication and, by extension awareness.

Analyzing all three of the interviews collectively reveals two characteristics about the relationship between military personnel and diplomats. Firstly, while the two generally work well together operationally, differences can arise with respect to policy. Secondly, the relationship is very dependent on the individual personalities and interest levels of those involved. All in all, the use of oral history in my project has been extremely beneficial. The interviews of these three

distinguished diplomats are invaluable in researching this topic. While some books allude to the relationship between Canadian diplomats and the military, none yield the same level of detail that is provided for through oral history.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Donald A. Ritchie, *Doing Oral History: A Practical Guide*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford 2003), 2.  
<http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uvic/detail.action?docID=422722>.

<sup>2</sup> The interviews were conducted as a part of the University of Victoria Veteran's Oral History Program.

<sup>3</sup> Nick Etheridge, interview by Harry McGuire, 15 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Charles Taylor, *Snow Job: Canada, the United States and Vietnam (1954 to 1973)*, (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1974), v.

<sup>8</sup> J. L. Granatstein and David Jay Bercuson, *War and Peacemaking* (Toronto, Ontario: Key Porter Books, 1991), 201.

<sup>9</sup> Taylor, *Snow Job*, 21.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., v.

<sup>11</sup> Granatstein, *War and Peacemaking*, 204.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 204.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Taylor, *Snow Job*, 21.

<sup>16</sup> Granatstein, *War and Peacemaking*, 205.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 206-07.

<sup>18</sup> Nick Etheridge, interview by Harry McGuire, 15 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Granatstein, *War and Peacemaking*, 207.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 207.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 207-08.

<sup>23</sup> Nick Etheridge, interview by Harry McGuire, 15 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Granatstein, *War and Peacemaking*, 207.

<sup>26</sup> Nick Etheridge, interview by Harry McGuire, 15 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> This theory is advanced in Taylor's *Snow Job* and Levant's *Quiet Complicity* (see bibliography).

<sup>30</sup> Taylor, *Snow Job*, vi.

<sup>31</sup> Nick Etheridge, interview by Harry McGuire, 15 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> David Collins, interview by Harry McGuire, 22 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Phil Calvert, interview by Harry McGuire, 22 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Christopher Kilford, "The Early Years: A Short History of Canada's Defence Attaché Program 1945-1965," *Canadian Military Journal* 12, no.4 (October 2012): 45-6.

<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/vol12/no4/page44-eng.asp>.

<sup>44</sup> Kilford, "The Early Years," 47.

<sup>45</sup> Phil Calvert, interview by Harry McGuire, 22 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Nick Etheridge, interview by Harry McGuire, 15 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>52</sup> David Collins, interview by Harry McGuire, 22 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>53</sup> Nick Etheridge, interview by Harry McGuire, 15 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>54</sup> Phil Calvert, interview by Harry McGuire, 22 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>55</sup> Geoffrey Moorehouse, *The Diplomats: The Foreign Office Today*, (London:Jonathan Cape, 332.

<sup>56</sup> Phil Calvert, interview by Harry McGuire, 22 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>57</sup> Nick Etheridge, interview by Harry McGuire, 15 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>58</sup> Phil Calvert, interview by Harry McGuire, 22 March 2019, Victoria.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Phil Calvert, interview by Harry McGuire, 22 March 2019, Victoria.

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