1. It is fundamental that Canada’s future lies in North America and profoundly so as an ally of the United States. Notwithstanding, Canada’s forces will be offered to UN and NATO operations from time to time.
2. Any such force will always be part of a larger international commitment based on treaty responsibility or coalition agreements.

1. force configuration shall be based on current assets where possible and new assets where demanded by the requirement.
2. the accomplishment of the international aim will not divert assets from current Canadian Forces responsibilities.

1. The defined range of operations includes the conduct of high level combat, thence contributions to international “stabilization” tasking (oft-times described as “peace making”), as well as tasks more popularly known as “peace-keeping”, internal disaster relief, aid to civil power and sovereignty.

The operational context for the ground force is evident from the events since the end of the Cold War. In the examples noted above, the force required to meet most threats in international operations was not of the weight needed to immediately conduct high level combat. However, high level combat capability was called for at one time or another during each of the examples.

The force must be capable of meeting and defeating threats that include among others; “insurgents,” individual and groupings of terrorists, “regular” forces not yet subdued, fielded enemy forces that are formed along traditional lines and so on.

Developing an expeditionary capability involves much more than simply transporting a ground force to a troubled location. It also calls for provision of “… appropriate initial and long term tactical naval, air and logistic support …” requiring appropriate command and control. The appointment of an overall Joint Force Commander is necessary, with the Naval, Air and Army elements of the force in subordination.

Size matters. To be effective the initial expeditionary force must be of sufficient size to secure its deployment and sustain it. It follows that the Canadian Forces must be capable of providing follow-on forces when the achievement of the mission is dependant on a larger force and over time to provide replacement forces to relieve the expeditionary force. To not have adequate assets is to invite attack, and the significant probability of defeat.

1. Any expeditionary force must train together, stay together and learn to fight together, so as to be able to cope with the “unexpected” – in any confrontation.
2. Joint operations command and control and effective delivery of combat power must be practiced and tested.
3. Confidence and trust between sea land and air is essential, and can only be generated by rigorous joint training, for the range of operations envisaged.

If the future is much like the past, the core operational requirement for most (if not all) missions is an infantry battalion. A lighter administrative tail than that provided for recent offshore contingents will suffice for the initial deployment. Troops should have the ability to live in field conditions and will initially be deployed equipped to survive under field conditions. Depending on the strategic lift available, the mechanized element (LAV) might well be limited. and centrally controlled by the CO. Mortars and pioneers would be attached from the artillery and engineers respectively and ideally helicopter support will be available. Additional resources such as Stryker, Coyotes and Engineers would be added dependant on the area of operations, the mission and the threat. Also dependant on the nature of the commitment, close in air support might be necessary.

This particular battle group calls for an all-up total of 1,050 to 1,200 troops in the ground force. It should be understood that these assets would be dedicated. That is to say, once formed the force is to remain together so as to train together so that it can conduct high level combat, stabilization, peacekeeping as the situation warrants.

The force required to conduct operations far from Canada and for often lengthy duration will be obliged to form itself such that there is an interdependence between its naval, ground and air elements. While recognizing that the ground force will often be offered to serve under UN, NATO, or US command, it would be fundamental to the aim that the force be self sufficient in all respects so that it need not depend upon the uncertainties of other nations support and infrastructure. Combined operations with allies or coalition forces must be accounted for in any force deployment structure.

It would be folly to send an expeditionary force off to do Canada’s work by assembling an ad hoc force each time called upon and then sending them off with inadequate training, lacking sustainability and having not developed and practiced joint command and control procedures.

1. A minimum force would be an infantry battalion battle group including appropriate supporting elements. This battle group must train together in order to develop the appropriate joint operational techniques, command and control procedures, thereby engendering trust and confidence so vital to mission success.
2. It will be necessary to draw the minimum force from a rapid reaction force of brigade size. The Brigade would consist of three battle groups of 800 to 1,000 men each. Two would be transported by sea. The third will be light and deliverable by air landing with a company that could alternatively be delivered by parachute. The initial priority will be one battle group by sea given its high value in support of our foreign policy.

1. Airlift or air delivery alone, either rented or acquired as assets will not suffice for the task.
2. Sealift ships with naval infrastructure are needed.
3. Preservation and enhancement of embarkation facilities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts is mandatory.
4. There is a need for a modest strategic airlift capability and an updated and increased tactical airlift.

“Time is of the essence” – “there is not a moment to lose” so go two famous quotes. Timeliness is critical, but so is getting the force into operations with minimum losses, and maximum effectiveness.

Experience suggests that it is critical that the entire force be ready to rapidly respond to the behest of the Government and be capable of conducting a variety of increasingly intense operations. It is important that some weight of the force be capable of being felt at the earliest opportunity. While it is critical to have the capability to insert a rapid reaction force at an early opportunity, it is also critical that the whole force should be capable of being placed in area of operations in its entirety, with all of its assets ready to engage on arrival. Thus, most timeliness, and most effectiveness is assured by the selection of airlift (parachute if necessary) for the insertion of the rapid reaction force and sealift for the insertion of the entire ground force. The Joint Force command and control and the necessary air and naval support for the Expeditionary force deploys as trained and structured.

If the operations area is subdued, and no threat to air is guaranteed – then airlift can be the preferred means. On the other hand, if the operational arena would not yet be altogether friendly then the Joint assets of the expeditionary force are deployed as for worst-case scenario.

Presently the Army can provide an appropriate Infantry battalion with suitable support elements added, i.e., mortar and engineer – with LAVIII, Stryker, Coyotes and Engineers capabilities added as needed. The soldiers can be trained in air and sea delivery techniques. Some airborne capability already exists, as does some air-mobile capability.

The Air Force can provide very limited tactical airlift with Hercules (suitable to support a larger sealift effort), and control of air can be delivered with CF-18’s with the proviso that tankers and forward aerodrome facilities are available. However, unless these facilities can be assured, the use of CF-18’s for this force is problematical. Other than CF-18’s at present there are no air assets that can be used to provide close air support – and with the few that are now available dedicated to North American Air Defence it is unlikely that any could be used for this purpose.

There is potential for back-up strategic airlift through the planned CGAR and GALE proposals, which call for the generation of an entity that will arrange for civil flight crews and aircraft be capable of delivering such assets as are proposed for the force on a regular basis.

The Navy cannot now provide an appropriate ship, or ships to transport troops of the ground force with its associated air support, equipment and stores. The planned three Joint Support Ship (JSS) will each have a measure of this capability but are being designed for employment primarily as replacements of the old AOR fleet supply ships for support of long-range operations of our frigates and destroyers. They are not designed to carry troop formations. Subject to availability, they will reduce though not eliminate reliance on chartered sea lift when speed of delivery is a key requirement of deployments

1. While a suitable ground force is available neither the Air Force nor the Navy has adequate assets in inventory that can be deployed to satisfy the aim. Currently the army has inadequate combat arms soldiers to maintain a sustainable expeditionary capability. Further, the acquisition of specialized sealift resources will require additional sailors.
2. The Navy requires appropriate ships for the transport of the ground force, and in the absence of tanker and the assurance of forward aerodrome facilities the Air Force needs an air defence/ground attack capability that can be fitted to force requirements.
3. The Air Force requires an upgrade and increase to its strategic and tactical airlift fleet, to its heli-lift fleet, and its capability to deliver air cover and close air support for the force.

Needed for the force is a type of ship that can transport the proposed ground force, and in addition is robust enough to be able to carry and deploy and air defence/ground attack element. The possible use of Naval assets for command and control must be part of the expeditionary package.

The requirement is for a prudent choice of ship, adequately sized with the flexibility and growth potential to meet changing needs over their long economic lives of 40 to 50 years. During this period, Canada’s population, economic power, external interests and defence requirements are destined to multiply. These ships should be capable of providing space and infrastructure for medical support – and for off shore Command and Control HQ’s.

It should be understood that a base like Shearwater on the Atlantic, with its generous facilities including the long runway in close proximity to the Halifax harbour, is a critical element to an expeditionary sealift capability. Shearwater is the logical and ideally located and equipped base, ready made at a billion dollar saving for the Atlantic division of Canadian expeditionary forces. Similarly Esquimault is the location of choice for basing the sealift ships, although the limitations of the Victoria airport and lack of a suitable railhead on the Island will favour Vancouver as the west coast port of embarkation. In the case of an emergency some Vancouver commercial port facilities would be acquired for use during the embarkation of the expeditionary force and the former CFB Chilliwack could be used for the short term as an assembly point for the land force. Vancouver International and Abbotsford Airports would provide adequate capabilities to meet air deployment needs.

A strategic airlift capability is needed, as is an upgrade to present tactical airlift. Contingent and co-located air assets for close air support and local control of the air are required. Extremely limited helicopter transport support to the force is available, so additional and more robust heli-lift resources are needed, and it will be necessary to acquire assets to provide close air support for the force. While the A-10 type is much preferred for close air support, likely Apache or Harrier assets will suit since on-board close air support capability is needed to assure mission success.

1. While appropriate ships to satisfy the aim are not now in the Navy’s inventory, the USN, as well as other Navy’s have suitable ships now serving and in production for their Marine Expeditionary fleet’s. Suitable embarkation facilities however, are already available on the east coast (at Shearwater), and those on the west coast are adequate but easily improved.
2. There is a need within the expeditionary force for Air Force air defence/close air support aircraft. Additional helicopter lift than currently exists in the CF inventory is also required.
3. There is a requirement to upgrade airlift resources i.e. replace and increase tactical airlift and to address the need for some level of a strategic airlift capability.

While it is necessary for the force to always train for high level combat, the bulk of the defined range of operations may, in the main, be to contribute to “stabilization” tasking(s) as well as tasks that have come to be known as “peace-keeping”, internal disaster relief, aid to civil power and sovereignty. To cope with belligerent forces in the area to be stabilized calls for a balanced force structured around a core of infantry.

The expeditionary force must have achieved an advanced level of training together as a joint force. For transporting the force, airlift alone (either rented or acquired) will not meet all requirements. The expeditionary force will require a mix of airlift and sealift as well as, enhancement of embarkation facilities on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

Finally, a force development plan that provides for adequate and appropriate manning and training for a force designed for expeditionary missions is required – summarized as follows:

Command Element – Serves as the headquarters for the entire force and allows a single command to exercise control over all ground, aviation, and combat service support forces. It must be capable of operating from a land base or at sea.

Ground Combat Element – Provides the force with its main combat punch. Built around an infantry battalion, reinforced with armour, artillery, amphibious vehicles, engineers, and reconnaissance assets. The deployment of these assets is totally mission dependent. The expeditionary force must always be capable of dealing with the worst-case scenario and always have the capability of being augmented and sustained by additional or follow on forces.

Aviation Combat Element – This consists of a medium helicopter assets, air defence and ground attack aircraft either fixed wing or rotary wing, and all necessary ground support assets.

Service Support Group – Provides the force with mission-essential support such as medical/dental assistance, logistics, supply, and maintenance, forward airbase operation capability. The key to all service support is sustained operations for the period of deployment.

1. Acquisition of a sealift capability and improvement of embarkation facilities, and
2. A dedicated infantry battalion battle group, and
3. Acquisition of upgraded and additional strategic and tactical air transport as well as air control assets, and
4. The development and creation of a dedicated joint expeditionary force trained for and capable of meeting the range of operations anticipated.

There are two preconditions to success, these conditions must be severely attenuated else the force will not be formed.

The first is loosening the influence of the procurement process upon the achievement of the aim. Any new program of any size becomes overwhelming to the day to day workings of NDHQ. The procurement system becomes concerned about the program office structure, the financial multi-year setup, protecting their funding from cuts or the other services, where it (they) shall be built, industrial offsets if any of the program must be contracted out of country etc., etc., It will be important to curtail the influence of the procurement system upon strategic and tactical requirements or changes to the assets required for the force.

Second, is the attenuation of the inter-service rivalry that prevails in NDHQ. Since integration NDHQ has learned to administer three services in one Headquarters, but has yet to learn how to arrange its affairs so that the three services can fight together. This is especially true when the funds available are not adequate to support current operations and normal replacement of assets – materiel and human. It is feared that the new funds allocated for the purpose of supporting an expeditionary force will be used for programs that do not contribute to the expeditionary force.

1. Funding for a directed program must be allocated by MND with Cabinet approval.
2. Procurement process to be best value and allow for off-shore buying and/or contracting options
3. Initial command and control of the force to reside in the Force Joint Headquarters

Within 90 days dedicate funding for the following:

1. Lease to purchase one Landing Platform, Dock (LPD) vessel. Assure that this vessel is capable of carrying an Infantry Battle Group with appropriate supporting equipment. Assure that the vessel has state of the art C² capability suitable for Joint Expeditionary operations with US and NATO allies.
2. Dedicate ground force assets and personnel to fit the delivery capacity of the vessel.
3. Dedicate air force assets and personnel to support the delivery, and protection of the ground force.
4. Establish a military entity “Force Joint Headquarters,” and charge it with the development of “use of force” protocols. Command of this force will be assumed by NDHQ DCDS upon the acceptance of the first vessel, to occur on or before 1 June 2005.
5. Arrange to lease or purchase at the earliest practical opportunity, two additional LPD vessels, with ground and air assets available for each vessel as noted at 2) and 3) above.